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In the United States today, trademark' counterfeiting 2 remains
1 The following is the statutory definition of a trademark:
The term 'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combina-
tion thereof.., used by a person, or... which a person has a bona fide intention to
use in commerce and applies to register on the principle register... to identify and
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured
or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is
unknown.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
Today, the exclusive right to use a trademark is granted by the federal government
for 10 years upon registration in the Patent and Trademark Office. 15 U.S.C. § 1058.
The trademark owner has the option of unlimited renewal for additional 10 year terms
upon the filing of an affidavit indicating that the mark is still in use. 15 U.S.C. § 1059.
This Comment does not address the problem of copyright counterfeiting. The stat-
utory definition of a copyright follows:
Copyright protection subsists.., in original works of authorship fixed in any tangi-
ble medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories: (1)
literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic
works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic
works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other
audiovisual works; and (7) sound recordings.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). Criminal sanctions for counterfeiting copyrighted materials
also exist. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (1982).
2 Counterfeiting is the most egregious form of trademark infringement. A mark
infringes a registered trademark when it is used without the permission of the owner of
the registered trademark, and is confusingly similar to the registered trademark. See 15
U.S.C. § 1114 (1988). Counterfeits do not include goods which merely imitate other
goods. See Wells, Mirror Images, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1988, (Magazine), at 76, col. 3
(cosmetic trade consists of many low cost imitators of more expensive goods that are not
infringements).
Under both the criminal and civil definitions, the term "counterfeit mark" refers to
a" 'spurous mark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a reg-
istered mark.'" 130 CONG. REC. H12076, H12078 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (Joint Legis-
lative Explanatory Statement) [hereinafter Joint Statement]. Another commentator has
stated that "[p]roduct counterfeiting is nothing less than the theft for profit of a firm's
reputation and product through the use of deception." Comment, The Effects of Foreign
Product Counterfeiting on U.S. Industry, 82 PAT. & TRADEMARK REV. 471, 472 (1984). Prod-
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a scourge to manufacturers attempting to protect their marks and to
consumers who seek authentic goods. Congress enacted the Trade-
mark Counterfeiting Act of 19843 ("the Act") to grapple with the
problem of trademark counterfeiting. The Act imposes criminal
sanctions4 for trademark counterfeiting and increases civil reme-
dies5 by codifying the right of trademark owners to obtain ex parte
seizure orders6 and treble damages. 7 Trademark counterfeiting,
however, continues to harm manufacturers through damaging the
reputation of goods,8 adverse product liability suits,9 legal and in-
vestigative fees, 10 the loss of the legal rights in the mark," and lost
revenue to counterfeit sales that range as high as an estimated
twenty-five billion dollars a year for American companies.'
2
Counterfeiting costs the United States jobs as well, with an esti-
uct counterfeiting is a broad term that includes the counterfeiting of trademarks as well
as copyrights. The use of the term in this Comment is restricted to trademarks. Simi-
larly, the term piracy usually refers only to copyrights, but in this Comment, cited au-
thors sometimes use the term to refer to trademarks as well as copyrights.
3 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2178 (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (1988) and as
amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-1118 (1988)).
4 18 U.S.C. § 2320.
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-1118.
6 15 U.S.C. § 11 16(d)(1)(A); see infra notes 216-233 and accompanying text.
7 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b); see infra notes 234-240 and accompanying text.
8 Comment, supra note 2, at 472. Counterfeits disparage the reputation of genuine
goods because they are usually of much poorer quality. Consumers may not realize that
the good is counterfeit, and may mistakenly associate the poor quality of the counterfeit
with the quality of the genuine and thereby decide not to buy the genuine. Counterfeits
of poor quality arise in many different products; for instance, oil filters made of recycled
asparagus cans and toilet paper plague motor boats. Banse, Repair Parts: The Name-Brand
Game, MOTOR BOAT & SAILING MAG., Feb. 1987, at 104.
9 Another problem for the trademark owner is the money lost to adverse product
liability judgments. This is caused by the inability in many accidents, where the good is
destroyed or severely damaged, to prove that a counterfeit good caused the harm in
question, a fact which would cut off liability to the trademark owner. Chiles, Anything
Can Be Counterfeited-And These Days Almost Everything Is, SMITHSONIAN, July, 1986 at 36.
10 Trademark owners may spend well over a million dollars a year in investigative
and legal fees fighting trademark counterfeiting. See, e.g., Arrest Two For Selling Counterfeit
Hair-Care Items, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 26, 1986 (Nexis, PR News file) [hereinafter Arrest]
(Nexxus company spent $1.5 million in one year on such fees).
11 A trademark owner may abandon his or her rights in the mark "when any course of
conduct of the owner, including acts of omission . . . causes the mark to become the
generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used or
otherwise to lose its significance as a mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1127(8)(2)(A)(2) (1988). An
act of omission can include not suing counterfeiters. See Keisel, Battling the Boom in Bogus
Goods, 71 A.B.A. J. 60, 62-63 (Mar. 1985). A delay in filing suit also exposes the trade-
mark owner to the loss of a cause of action against a defendant through laches. Joint
Statement, supra note 2, at H12078; see Chiles, supra note 9, at 36.
12 Finn, That's The $60 Billion Question, FORBES, Nov. 17, 1986, at 40 (estimated an-
nual counterfeit sales at $60 billion internationally); Crandall, The Cost of Counterfeit Prod-
ucts, CONSUMERS RES. MAG., May 1986, at 33 ("cost to U.S. companies is nearly $20
billion annually in retail sales").
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mated loss of 210,000 jobs annually to fake automobile parts
alone.' 3 It diminishes state and federal tax bases, and poses a po-
tentially deadly safety hazard for the public. For example, the
"[w]idespread counterfeiting and failures of... high-strength fas-
teners have been reported in building and construction sites, coal
mines, helicopters, highway bridges and guard rails, nuclear and
fossil fuel utilities, and commercial trucks and buses."' 4 Counterfeit
birth control pills,' 5 hormones,' 6 shampoo,' 7 and eyewear, 18 and
heart pumps' 9 have created other well documented health risks.
Counterfeit transisters were even discovered in parts destined for
the space shuttle.20
Counterfeiters today are successful in part because they have
no built-in research and development costs; they can undersell legit-
imate manufacturers. 2' They also can cut comers on quality, be-
13 SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., UNFAIR FOREIGN TRADE PRACTICES: STEALING
AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: IMITATION IS NOT FLATTERY 46 (Comm. Print 98-v)
(1984) [hereinafter SUBCOMMITTEE] (statistic provided by Linda Hoffman of the Auto-
motive Parts and Accessories Association).
14 SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE THREAT FROM SUBSTANDARD FASTENERS: IS
AMERICA LOSING ITS GRIP? 3 (Comm. Print 100-Y) (1988); see also Isgro, The Hidden Threat
to Air Safety, FORTUNE, April 13, 1987, at 81 ("Air safety experts believe the phony parts
issue is potentially more serious among smaller upstart lines and in the privately owned
plane and helicopter market, where maintenance may be more casual.").
15 1285 FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP. (CCH) Para. 44,035 (July 3, 1987) [hereinafter
FDA]; ("Fox Meyer Corp. is voluntarily recalling all Ovulen-21 packages bearing the lot
numbers 441 and 489 because of counterfeits.").
16 Id. at Para. 40,400 ("The F.D.A. has alerted athletes, coaches, and physicians that
counterfeit human chorionic gonadotropin that is being distributed on the black market
is nonsterile and pyrogenic."); see also Fake Horse Hormones, FDA CONSUMER, May 1988, at
36 ("Closer control of steroid sources and prescriptions has made Equipoise [a drug
used legally to make horses stronger but also used illegally by body builders] harder to
obtain, so suppliers of illegal steroids have begun selling their body-building customers
counterfeit versions, complete with phony labels and lot numbers ... [with] no active
ingredients.").
17 Arrest, supra note 10.
18 Bausch & Lomb Reports On Counterfeit Ray-Ban Seizure, PR NEWSWIRE, June 26, 1985
(Nexis, PR News file) ("Bogus sunglasses' lenses may not protect against harmful rays
nor provide impact resistance.").
19 SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 13, at 38.
20 Rakoff& Wolff, Commercial Counterfeiting and the Proposed Trademark Counterfeiting Act,
20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 153, n.62 (1982) (citing Fenby, Boom in Brand Name Fakes,
READER'S DIGEST (English ed.), Sept. 1981, at 135).
21 James Enyart of Monsanto captured the research and development edge that
counterfeiters possess, with a note of frustration: "'You spend millions to develop a
herbicide and then you've got to market it. You do all that and then some guy in Taiwan
with some pots and pans flanged together can undercut the hell out of your price.'"
Finn, supra note 12, at 40.
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cause they are not interested in repeat customers. 22 The majority of
counterfeit goods finally reach consumers through street vendors,
flea markets, and discount stores.23 Yet they can damage consumers
indirectly through incidents like plane crashes or auto accidents.
This Comment evaluates the effectiveness of the criminal penal-
ties for trademark counterfeiting invoked in the Trademark Coun-
terfeiting Act of 1984 through an analysis of caselaw and current
literature. This Comment suggests that such penalties are poten-
tially the most powerful deterrent against trademark counterfeiting
in the United States, but to date inadequate enforcement has under-
cut their effectiveness. It suggests that the problem of trademark
counterfeiting is significant enough to warrant a greater role for fed-
eral law enforcement authorities in the investigation and prosecu-
tion of trademark counterfeiters. Part II of this Comment discusses
the history of trademark counterfeiting and criminal sanctions, as
well as the Act's criminal provisions and the judicial response to
them. Part III discusses the current alternatives to the Act, includ-
ing international efforts pursued by the United States, Customs en-
forcement, state anti-counterfeiting criminal laws, and the civil
remedies under the Act. Finally, Part IV discusses the need for in-
creased criminal prosecutions under the Act.
II. TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING AND CRIMINAL LAWS TO COMBAT
THE PROBLEM
A. THE HISTORY OF TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING
Trademarks have been in use for centuries, and counterfeiting
of trademarks has always been a problem:
The Greeks marked their works of art with the name of the sculptor.
Greek pottery from the earliest times has borne inscriptions, usually
the name of the maker and on decorated pieces the name of the deco-
rator. The cup handles from the Ceramicus of Athens beside the
22 Crandall, supra note 12, at 33 ("Because they are not out for repeat business, they
cut corners on quality, safety and cleanliness to produce their fakes as cheaply as
possible.").
23 Is It Real? Counterfeit Goods Are Big Business-How to Avoid Getting Ripped Off, GLAM-
OUR, May 1987, at 210. According to James L. Bikoff, a Washington, D.C., attorney
representing trademark owners:
It isn't just street vendors who sell counterfeits. Discount stores may knowingly or
unknowingly stock their shelves with bogus goods. In addition to legitimately ob-
tained close-out merchandise, they may carry counterfeit designer brands made by
renegade contractors who at one time legitimately produced goods for a company,
then kept patterns and went into business for themselves. Even reputable stores are





maker's name often bore real trade marks as figures of Mercury staffs,
oil jugs, bees, lions' heads, and the like. Greek inscriptions have been
found on Etruscan vases dated from 800 to 400 B.C. This has sug-
gested the question whether these vases were truly a Greek product, or
whether the Etruscan potter had copied the trade mark of some cele-
brated Greek maker, as the Roman engravers and sculptors were in
the habit of doing in later times.2 4
Medieval artisans used trademarks extensively to identify their
goods.2 5 Counterfeiters in medieval times copied many items, par-
ticularly the trademarks of publishers on the covers of books.2 6 Af-
ter the Revolutionary War, trademark counterfeiting was a problem
in the United States. For instance, in 1791 Secretary of State
Thomas Jefferson was concerned enough about counterfeiting to
write a letter to Congress calling for legislation invoking penal sanc-
tions for trademark counterfeiting.
27
Edward Rogers, an original drafter of the Lanham Act,28 which
still governs the vast majority of trademark law today, suggested at
the beginning of this century that the use of trademarks throughout
history is a reflection of market conditions. For instance, when
goods are produced in a localized setting, quality assurances are
made through the interaction of consumer and producer. However,
when goods are mass produced and distributed on a wider basis,
beyond the localized setting, the use of marks becomes necessary as
a source indicator to assure the quality of the goods purchased.29
Consequently, at the beginning of the twentieth century, when
commercial activities had significantly expanded over the past sev-
eral decades, the use of trademarks had also increased "as either the
cause or the effect of modern advertising. ' 3 0 People began to rely
more and more on trademarks as a source indicator and an assur-
ance of quality. Trademark counterfeiting consequently became a
potentially more serious problem as there were more trademarks to
counterfeit and more consumers who were vulnerable to such activ-
ity. Increased demand for certain trademarks only served to exacer-
bate the vulnerability of consumers. For example, during
24 Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trademarks, 9 MICH. L. REv. 29, 30 (1910)
(citations omitted). For more historical information on trademark counterfeiting, see
Pattishall, The Constitutional Foundations of American Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP.
456, 458 (1988) (citing Greenberg, The Ancient Lineage of Trade-Marks, 33 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc. 876 (1951); Daniels, The History of the Trade-Mark, 7 TRADEMARK BULL. 239 (1911)).
25 Rogers, supra note 24, at 32.
26 Id. at 35.
27 Id. at 41.
28 The Lanham Act ofJuly 5, 1946, Ch. 540, § 46 (a), 60 Stat. 444.
29 Rogers, supra note 24, at 39-40.
30 Id. at 43.
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Prohibition, when there were severe restrictions on alcohol supply
but a steady demand for certain high quality spirits, a fake alcohol
industry thrived and eventually led to the paralyzation of the hands
and feet of 15,000 drinkers in 1930 alone.3' As the economy grew,
counterfeiting affected many other products. In the 1930s there
were reports of fake aspirin, ginger ale, razors, auto parts, cigars,
and deodorant, while in the 1950s fake polio vaccines and in the
1960s phony helicopter parts highlighted the news.32 By the mid-
1970s, a boom in counterfeiting occurred as consumers took a great
interest in designer marks and labels.33 At the beginning of the
1980s, the demand for marks of all types increased, and the counter-
feiters responded in kind.3
4
B. THE HISTORY OF CRIMINAL STATUTES AGAINST TRADEMARK
COUNTERFEITING
Some form of law or custom has been invoked to stop trade-
mark counterfeiting probably since Roman times.3 5 The first re-
corded criminal anti-counterfeiting laws arose in medieval times:
As early as the thirteenth century, the copying of valuable marks be-
came so common and so injurious that infringement was made a mis-
demeanor and in some cases even a felony and was punished in the
barbarous manner characteristic of the times. The Elector of Palantine
in the Fourteenth Century [sic] issued an edict which, after reciting
that the sale of spurious wine was the most outrageous form of deceit,
punished by hanging any innkeeper who sold ordinary wine as
Rudesheimer.3
6
In modern times, the United States has been slow in protecting in-
tellectual property rights.3 7 Congress enacted the first federal stat-
ute concerning trademarks in 1870.38 Congress imposed3 9 the first
31 Chiles, supra note 9, at 36.
32 Id.
33 Higgins & Rubin, Counterfeit Goods, 79J. L. & ECON. 211 (1986) (noting the popu-
larity of such labels as Izod and Calvin Klein and the "snob" appeal, analyzed in eco-
nomic terms, that goes into labels when they are treated as status symbols).
34 Rakoff & Wolff, supra note 20, at 150 (Counterfeiting markets shadow the success
of a legitimate mark, and sometimes outstrip the growth in production of the legitimate
mark as the production of a counterfeit is more profitable.).
35 Although Roman Laws criminalizing counterfeiting have not been found, it is
thought that some did exist. Rogers, supra note 25, at 32.
36 Id. at 33 (citation omitted).
37 The first reported case involving a trademark in the United States was in 1837.
Thomson v. Winchester, 19 Mass. (214 Pick.) (1837). See generally Comment, Trade-
marks-Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551, 565-69 (1969) (discussing early
trademark cases in the United States).
38 Act ofJuly 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 198 (Act allowed for the registra-
tion of trademarks); Pattishall, Two Hundred Years of American Trademark Law, 68 TRADE-
810 [Vol. 80
TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING
criminal sanctions against trademark counterfeiting in 1876 by
amending the 1870 Act with the following provision:
[E]very person who shall with intent to defraud, deal in or sell, or keep
or offer for sale, or cause or procure the sale of, any goods of substan-
tially the same descriptive properties as those referred to in the regis-
tration of any trade-mark, pursuant to the statutes of the United
States, to which, or to the package in which the same are put up, is
fraudulently affixed said trade mark [sic], or any colorable imitation
thereof, calculated to deceive the public, knowing the same to be
counterfeit or not the genuine goods referred to in said registration,
shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not exceeding one
thousand dollars, or imprisonment not more than two years, or both
such fine and imprisonment. 4
0
The criminal provisions foresaw the effectiveness of combining
monetary fines and prison sentences. Three years later, however,
the Supreme Court voided the criminal provisions of the 1876
Amendment in the Trade-Mark Cases.
41
The Trade-Mark Cases consolidated the cases of three defendants
indicted for the possession with the-intent to defraud of counterfeit
trademarks for champagne and whiskey. 42 The indictments fell
under sections four and five of the 1876 Act criminalizing trademark
counterfeiting. 43 The issue of the case concerned the constitution-
ality of the 1870 Act.44 The prosecution urged that the Act was
valid as an exercise of congressional power to regulate under the
commerce clause of the Constitution. 45 The Court, however, ruled
that the 1870 Act was unconstitutional on the grounds that Con-
gress had erroneously based the authority of the Act on the Consti-
MARK REP. 121, 129-30 (1978) (The 1870 Act provided for damages and injunctive relief
as remedies for counterfeiting any registered mark.).
39 Congress enacted the statutes to provide reciprocal protection for intellectual
property to countries with whom the U.S. had treaties, and to protect the manufacturers
and merchants who had lobbied for the passage of the measures. Derenberg, The Problem
of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 439, 443 (1956).
40 Act of August 14, 1876, ch. 278, § 1, 19 Stat. 141.
41 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
42 Id. at 82-83.
43 Sections 4 and 5 of the Act of 1876 are as follows:
Sect. 4. That any person or persons who shall, with intent to defraud any person or
persons, knowingly and wilfully cast, engrave, or manufacture ... [a] trademark,
registered pursuant to the statutes of the United States, shall, upon conviction
thereof, be punished .... Sect. 5. That any person or persons who shall, with intent
to defraud any person or persons, knowingly and wilfully... counterfeit, or have in
his, her, or their possession, or buy, sell, offer for sale, or deal in... [a] trademark,
registered pursuant to the Statutes of the United States, shall, upon conviction
thereof, be punished ....
Id. at 83-84.
44 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 84-85.
45 Id. at 85.
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tution's patent and copyright clause. 46 Apparently, the drafters of
the 1870 Act had confused trademark and copyright law, "for it was
entitled ingenuously, 'An Act To Revise, Consolidate, and Amend
The Statutes Relating To Patents And Copyrights.' "47 Although
the Court set aside the commerce clause argument,48 the Court
commented that the Act would not be found to be a valid exercise of
the Commerce Clause if it attempted to regulate commerce between
citizens of the same state.49 The Court held that the criminal provi-
sions were also invalid because the 1876 Act imposing criminal
sanctions rested on the validity of the 1870 Act.50
Of the several trademark acts passed by Congress after the
1876 Act, including the Act of 1881,51 the Act of 1905,52 and lastly
the Lanham Act of 1946,53 none contained criminal provisions.
These Acts lacked criminal provisions conceivably because the
Trade-Mark Cases involved criminal indictments. 54 Because of this
tie to criminal sanctions, Congress may have developed something
akin to a psychological reticence to the idea of equating criminal
sanctions with trademark counterfeiting.55 In other words, once
burned by a famous case, Congress was wary about venturing again
into the realm of criminal penalties for trademark counterfeiting.
C. THE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE TRADEMARK
COUNTEREITING ACT OF 1984
Congress finally imposed criminal sanctions for trademark
counterfeiting with the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984.56
The criminal sanctions of the Act on their face are an impressive
deterrent. 57 The criminal provisions in the Act impose maximum
penalties of five years imprisonment or a $250,000 fine or both for
46 Id. at 94.
47 Pattishall, supra note 24, at 461.
48 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 95.
49 Id. at 96-97.
50 Id. at 99.
51 Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502 (1881) (revived the registration portion
of the Act of 1870 but limited its application to commerce with foreign nations and not
interstate commerce).
52 Act of February 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (reinstated federal registration for
interstate commerce).
53 The Lanham Act of July 5, 1946, Ch. 540, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 444 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988)); SeeJ. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
CoMPETrrIoN § 5.4 (2d ed. 1984).
54 Derenberg, supra note 39, at 443.
55 Id. at 444.
56 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2178 (criminal sanctions codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2320
(1988)).
57 18 U.S.C. § 2320.
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an individual first offender.58 A repeat offender may be sentenced
to fifteen years in prison or a $1,000,000 fine or both.59 Corpora-
tions may be fined $1,000,000 for the first offense, and $5,000,000
for a second offense. 6
0
The sanctions apply to "[w]homever intentionally traffics or at-
tempts to traffic in goods or services and knowingly uses a counter-
feit mark on or in connection with such goods or services." 61 The
first element, trafficking in counterfeit goods, is defined as using, or
intending to use, a mark in commerce "as consideration for any-
thing of value." 62 Thus, the purchase of counterfeit items for per-
sonal use is not penalized under the Act.
63
The prosecution must also demonstrate that the mark in ques-
tion is indeed counterfeit. The Act defines a counterfeit mark as:
(A) a spurious mark-
(i) that is used in connection with trafficking in goods or
services;
(ii) that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from,
a mark registered for those goods or services on the principal
register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office
and in use, whether or not the defendant knew such mark was
so registered; and
(iii) the use of which is likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake,
or to deceive .... 64
the first subpart of the definition requires showing that the mark is
used "in connection with [the] trafficking of goods." Trafficking is
usually established simply by purchasing a counterfeit good from
the defendant prior to his or her arrest.65
The second subpart of the counterfeit definition includes the
requirement that the mark in question be "substantially indistin-
guishable" from the genuine mark. This definition does not require
that the mark be exactly identical to the genuine mark registered
with the Patent and Trademark Office.6 6 The term "substantially
indistinguishable" is not defined by the Act; rather, it is determined
58 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. The Act applies to trafficking in both goods and services, but the overwhelm-
ing majority of cases will involve strictly counterfeit goods. Olson, An Analysis of the
Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, an Outline of a Speech, reprinted in TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 17 (1985).
62 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d)(2).
63 Joint Statement, supra note 2, at H12078.
64 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d). The Act also protects Olympic symbols. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320(d)(1)(B).
65 See United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 1987).
66 Joint Statement, supra note 2, at H12078.
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on a case-by-case basis, 67 and a prosecutor can establish it through
the use of expert testimony.
68
The final subpart of the definition of a counterfeit mark re-
quires a showing that the mark in question is "likely to cause confu-
sion, to cause mistake, or to deceive." This standard incorporates
the wording of the Lanham Act "to ensure that no conduct will be
criminalized by the Act that does not constitute trademark infringe-
ment under the Lanham Act." 69 Thus, the standards established by
civil cases for determining confusion under the Lanham Act should
be used to determine the standards for confusion in criminal cases
under the Trademark Counterfeiting Act.70 In United States v. Tork-
ington,7' for example, the Eleventh Circuit followed the Lanham Act
cases in recognizing a cause of action based on the possibility of
post-sale confusion. In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit disposed of
the district court's assertion that the price disparity between the
genuine and counterfeit goods in question, which in Torkington were
counterfeit Rolex watches, eliminated any actionable confusion.
72
Such price disparity was relevant only to the direct sale context, and
not to the post-sale context.
73
After establishing the three subparts of the definition of a coun-
terfeit mark, the prosecution must establish two mental elements
under the Act: intentional trafficking and knowing use of a counter-
feit mark.74 The government can prove the intentional trafficking
element by showing that defendant sold or obtained the goods in
question " 'on purpose' -75 through, for instance, a purchase of
counterfeit goods from the defendant prior to his or her arrest.
76
The knowledge element of the use of a counterfeit mark is a little
more difficult to prove, as the prosecution must show that the de-
fendant had "an awareness or a firm belief" that the mark was coun-
67 Id.
68 See United States v. M. Laufner Enters., 817 F.2d 759, n.2 (11 th Cir. 1987) (" 'doc-
umentary evidence and expert testimony establishing that the trademarks and watch de-
signs were nearly identical to the registered products sufficient to sustain jury verdict' "),
quoted in United States v. McEvoy, 820 F.2d 1170, 1172 (11 th Cir. 1987)).
69 Joint Statement, supra note 2, at H12078.
70 Torkington, 812 F.2d at 1351 n.4.
71 Id. at 1352.
72 Id. at 1350.
73 Id. For instance, the price of a counterfeit watch is usually much lower than the
normal price for a genuine. This price disparity indicates to the direct purchaser that
the watch is a counterfeit. A consumer who merely sees a person wearing a counterfeit
watch, however, may not realize that it is a fake because that person does not have a
similar price indicator.
74 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (1988).
75 Joint Statement, supra note 2, at H12076.
76 Torkington, 812 F.2d at 1349.
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terfeit.7 7 The prosecution can also meet this proof, however, by
showing that the defendant was " 'wilfully blind' " to the counterfeit
nature of the mark.7
8
Certain goods are exempt from the Act. For instance, gray
market goods79 are exempt because current Treasury Department
regulations allow for their importation. 80 Also, if a licensee manu-
factures too much of a good under a valid trademark licensing
agreement, those "overruns" are not considered counterfeit goods
because of the owner's initial approval.8 ' Congress' rationale for
the overrun exception is as follows: " 'The trademark owner has put
the wheels in motion for the manufacturer to make the overruns,
and has the means to protect himself or herself... The contractual
and other civil remedies already existing make it inappropriate to
criminalize such practices.' "82 The overrun exception does not ap-
ply, however, if the licensee uses the mark for goods not covered by
the licensing agreement.8 3 Trade dress 84 is also not covered by the
Act unless it is registered as a trademark.
Finally, defendants have the same affirmative defenses available
to them in a criminal counterfeiting case as they do in a civil one.8 5
For instance, the defendant has the burden of proving the affirma-
tive defenses of laches and anti-trust violations by a preponderence
of the evidence.
8 6
Sentencing under the Act is discretionary within the scope of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines.8 7 The legislative history
stresses that an appropriate deterrent would include a combination
of a prison term and fines. 88 The drafters of the Act recognized,
however, that the imposition of the maximum fines would be un-
likely except for the most egregious forms of counterfeiting.89
77 Joint Statement, supra note 2, at H12076.
78 Id. at H12077.
79 Gray market goods are defined as "trademarked goods legitimately manufactured
and sold overseas and then imported into the United States outside the trademark
owner's desired distribution channels." Joint Statement, supra note 2, H 12079.
80 Id.; see K-Mart v. Cartier, 485 U.S. 191 (1988) (reaffirming the legality of Treasury
regulations that permit the entry of gray market goods into the United States).
81 Joint Statement, supra note 2, at H12079 (citation omitted).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Trade dress "is the color, shape or design of a product or its packaging." Id.
85 Id. at H12078.
86 Id.
87 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1988).
88 Joint Statement, supra note 2, at H12077.
89 Id. "In a case in which a defendant trafficked in counterfeits that pose a grave
danger to the public health and safety, these maximum penalties may be fully war-
ranted." Id. For instance, in United States v. Hon, No. 89 Cr. 0052 (S.D.N.Y. May 31,
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D. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE ACT
The Supreme Court of the United States has not ruled on the
validity of the Act, but the Second,90 Fifth, 91 Eighth,92 and Elev-
enth93 Circuits have all consistently upheld criminal convictions
under its provisions against a variety of challenges. 94 The reported
cases interpreting the Act are few in number and focus almost exclu-
sively on counterfeit watches, in particular those of Rolex U.S.A.
95
1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file), the United States Sentencing Guidelines rec-
ommended a sentence of 8-14 months imprisonment for trafficking in over $50,000
worth of counterfeit watches. The defendant received a sentence of 36-months proba-
tion and a $6,000 fine; the court stressed that one of the mitigating factors in this case
was that the defendant posed no danger to society. Id.
In contrast, in United States v. Shinyder, No.JH 86-0134 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1989),
the defendant received a much stiffer sentence of two concurrent five year prison
sentences for selling counterfeit shampoo and conditioner. Id. This counterfeit sham-
poo was sold across the country and "contain[ed] a high amount of bacteria in some
cases and could cause eye infections and sores on the scalp." Horwitz, FBI Sting Nets
Shampoo Fraud Suspect, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 27, 1986, at El, col 5, quoted in Bikoff,
Use of the Criminal Law to Combat Commercial Counterfeiting and Piracy in the United
States (1988) (unpublished manuscript)). The threat to the public from such shampoo
undoubtedly led to the stiff sentence.
90 United States v. Marziotto, 849 F.2d 1468, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1507 (2d Cir. 1988) (de-
fendant's conviction for trafficking in counterfeit Met's baseball souvenirs upheld
against several asserted points of error dealing with the facts of the case, with a note by
the court that this opinion is limited to the facts of the case and should not be cited as
precedent); Hon, No. 89 Cr. 0052 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1989) (defendant convicted under
the Act of trafficking in counterfeit watches).
91 United States v. Baker, 807 F.2d 427, 428 (5th Cir. 1986) (conviction under the
Act upheld for trafficking in counterfeit Rolex watches against a mistake of law defense);
United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 133 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, Firouz v. United States,
109 S. Ct. 3258 (1989) (defendants' convictions for trafficking in counterfeit Rolex,
Piaget, Cartier, and Gucci watches upheld against a challenge to the possibility of post-
sale confusion).
92 United States v. Gantos, 817 F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 860 (1987)
(conviction under the Act upheld for selling counterfeit Rolex watches against defend-
ant's assertion that the prosecution must prove a specific intent to violate the statute and
other asserted points of error).
93 United States v. McEvoy, 820 F.2d at 1170, 1172 (11th Cir. 1987) (defendant's
conviction under the Act of trafficking in counterfeit Rolex, Piaget, and Gucci watches
upheld against the assertion that the Act is unconstitutionally vague and that it unconsti-
tutionally shifts the burden of proof onto the defendants); United States v. M. Laufer
Enters., 817 F.2d 759 (1 lth Cir. 1987) (conviction for trafficking in counterfeit watches
upheld); United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 1987) (court of
appeals reversed district court decision dismissing both counts of the indictment against
the defendant for trafficking in counterfeit Rolex watches on the ground that replica
Rolex watches were not "counterfeit" under the Act); United States v. Gonzales, 630 F.
Supp. 894 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (defendant convicted of selling counterfeit Rolex watches).
94 See supra notes 90-93.
95 See also United States v. Almany, 872 F.2d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1989) (dismissal of an
appeal from a district court's order denying a request to shift the proceedings to the
Patent & Trademark Office and to discover certain grand jury transcripts in a case in-
volving a defendant indicted with trafficking in counterfeit Rolex, Piaget, Cartier, and
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Of the ten reported cases only one deals with another counterfeit
good, Mets' baseball souvenirs. 96 One unreported case 97 deals with
a dangerous counterfeit good and the FBI's role in a sting operation
to catch the defendant by posing as a potential buyer.
98
The precise number of unreported cases is difficult to deter-
mine. The arrest or prosecution of counterfeiters of potentially
dangerous goods is often publicized in the popular press. 99 If the
number of published reports in the popular press is an accurate in-
dicator, there are not many unreported cases of dangerous goods
under the Act. Even if there are many more unreported counterfeit-
ing cases, the lack of publicity lessens the impact of their deterrent
value. To date, the criminal sanctions of the Act have not been a
significant deterrent in the marketplace.100 More criminal prosecu-
tions are needed to increase the Act's deterrent value,10' especially
against the production of dangerous goods.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE CRIMINAL PROVISIONS OF THE
TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING ACT OF 1984
A. FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTES
Federal criminal fraud statutes t0 2 with applications to trade-
Gucci watches); United States v. Infurnari, 647 F. Supp. 57 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (case deal-
ing with a pre-trial order of a defendant accused of selling counterfeit Piaget and Rolex
watches).
96 United States v. Marziotto, 849 F.2d 1468, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1507 (2d Cir. 1988).
97 United States v. Shinyder, No.JH 86-0134 (D. Md.July 1, 1986); see Horwitz, supra
note 89, and accompanying text.
98 Id.; see also Arrest, supra note 10.
99 For examples of the press reports surrounding the counterfeit Nexxus shampoo
case, Shinyder, No. JH 86-0134 (D. Md. July 1, 1986), see Horwitz, supra note 89, and
Arrest, supra note 10.
100 In reference to the Act, two commentators have noted that "at least to date, it has
had very little effect on activities in the marketplace." Springut & Tucker, Battling the
Counterfeiting Contagion: The Nuts and Bolts of Fighting Counterfeiters, 14 Am. INTELL. PROP.
L.A. QJ. 263, 265 (1986).
101 James Bikoff, an attorney in Washington, D.C., who represents trademark owners,
stated in 1988 that "there remains a need for criminal prosecutions of commercial coun-
terfeiters to create the necessary deterrent to commercial counterf6iting." Bikoff, supra
note 89.
102 Before the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 and even today, federal authori-
ties have had the right to prosecute trademark counterfeiters for a variety of federal
crimes including: mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) (maximum penalty of a $1,000
fine or five years imprisonment or both); wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (maximum pen-
alty of a $1,000 fine or five years imprisonment or both); defrauding the United States,
18 U.S.C. § 1002 (maximum penalty of $10,000 or five years imprisonment or both);
transportation of stolen goods worth over $5,000, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (maximum penalty
of $10,000 fine or 10 years imprisonment or both); and the receipt of stolen goods




mark counterfeiting have been in existence for 118 years.' 03 They
have received only token enforcement from the United States Attor-
ney's Office, however, arguably because the fraud statutes are vague
and do not specifically address counterfeiting, and because of a lack
of resources. 10 4 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act ("RICO") also was touted as a means of curtailing the ex-
tensive racketeering in trademark counterfeiting prior to the Act,
and it remains a viable option today. 10 5 The government has never
brought a RICO count in a criminal case for trademark fraud, how-
ever,' 0 6 and there is only one reported case of a RICO count at-
tempted in a civil trademark counterfeiting case.' 0 7 Commentators
have suggested that Justice Department guidelines hamper the en-
forcement of criminal RICO. 08
103 Rakoff & Wolff, supra note 20, at 170. "Since 1872, federal prosecutors have pos-
sessed, in the mail fraud statute, something akin to a general fraud statute ...." Id.
104 Id. at 170-76. "In any given year, a typical United States Attorney's Office, having
resources to prosecute, say, twenty 'miscellaneous' fraud cases under the mail and wire
fraud statutes, would typically choose to prosecute a few cases in each of several new
areas that had not previously been much addressed." Id. at 174-75. See also Trademark
Counterfeiting Act of 1984: Hearings on H.R. 2447 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House
Committee on theJudiciary, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 61 (1983) (testimony of TimothyJ. Finn,
Associate Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice) (significant jurisdic-
tional burdens of proof and low criminal fines inhibit prosecutions under the federal
anti-fraud provisions).
105 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(1988) ("RICO"). Maximum criminal penalties under RICO include a $25,000 fine or
twice the gross profits of the illegal enterprise or 20 years imprisonment or both, and a
forfeiture of assets involved in the criminal activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1063.
106 BNA Trademark Conference Addresses Enforcement, Change, 35 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHTJ. (BNA) 462 (March 31, 1988) [hereinafter Conference] (Lawrence Lippe, a justice
Department official, acknowledges the possibility of a RICO criminal count for trade-
mark counterfeiting, but claims that the proper fact scenario has not arisen for such an
action).
107 Ford Motor Co. v. B & H Supply, 646 F. Supp. 975 (D. Minn. 1986), later proceeding,
2 U.S.P.Q2d 1870 (1987). In a case involving the use of counterfeit Ford trademarks on
auto parts, id. at 980, the court held for Ford generally, but not on the RICO claim. Id.
at 1001. It found that the plaintiff did not establish that the defendant's marketing,
sales, and distribution of counterfeit parts and spurious packaging constituted racketeer-
ing activity or a pattern of racketeering, and thus did not establish two essential ele-
ments of its RICO claim. Id. Ford met the other elements of the RICO claim, namely
"the existence of an enterprise and the defendant's participation in the conduct of that
enterprise .. ." Id. at 999; see also Processed Apples, Inc. v. Food Complex, Inc., No. 82
Civ. 1959 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 1982) (successful RICO and Lanham Act claims in an unre-
ported opinion), cited in Rakoff & Wolff, supra note 20, at 174 n.225. Commentators
suggest that RICO's broad scope has led courts to caution against its overuse in civil
cases. Id. Civil RICO allows for the award of treble damages and attorney's fees. 18
U.S.C. § 1964.
108 Rakoff & Wolff, supra note 20, at 174 n.225. These guidelines will become more
stringent as the Justice Department "recently disclosed details of policy changes made
this summer that tighten the rules for prosecuting criminal cases under the Racketeer
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Even statutes enacted to deal with trademark counterfeiting in a
specific area, such as the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
have suffered from a lack of enforcement. 10 9 Thus, "neither the
mail and wire fraud statutes nor any other existing federal criminal
statutes provide an adequate weapon for combatting commercial
counterfeiting."" 10 The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984111
solved the specificity problem in previous federal statutes, as it only
addresses trademark counterfeiting. Yet the problem of inadequate
enforcement remains, and the Act's effectiveness as a deterrent may
ultimately suffer the fate of earlier federal statutes.
B. MULTINATIONAL EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES TO COPE WITH
AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM
The problem of trademark counterfeiting is international in
scope."x 2 The point of origin of most counterfeit goods entering
the United States is usually in developing countries where counter-
feiting is practically encouraged by lax or non-existent anti-counter-
feiting laws and where sometimes "the culture attaches no particular
onus to such action."' 113 A United States House Subcommittee
named the worst counterfeiting offenders: Taiwan, South Korea,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Bra-
zil, Colombia, Mexico, and Nigeria. 114 For some of these develop-
ing countries, counterfeiting "may have become a de facto national
industrial development strategy." 115 Paula Stern, then Chairperson
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act." Safeguarding the Use of RICO, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Nov. 4, 1989, (editorial page), at 12, col 1.
109 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (1988) (penalties of up to a $1,000 fine or one year in prison or
both for a first offense); 21 U.S.C. § 333(b) (penalties of up to $10,000 or three years
imprisonment or both). There has been only one reported criminal conviction under
the Act in the last 20 years. See United States v. Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 651 F.2d 532, 551 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982) (defendants'
convictions upheld for sevein year prison sentences and fines for multiple violations of
the Act, including counterfeiting drugs). In the last few years, the FDA has conducted
numerous civil seizures of counterfeit Naprosyn and birth control pills. See FDA, supra
note 15, at Paras. 37,034, 37,032, 37,133, 37,216, & 37,019.
110 Rakoff & Wolff, supra note 20, at 176; Keisel, supra note 11, at 63.
111 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2178 (criminal sanctions codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2320
(1988)).
112 Estimated amount of annual worldwide sales in counterfeit goods ranges as high
as $60 billion dollars. Finn, supra note 12, at 40. Sixty-two percent of the goods pro-
duced abroad are sold in the United States according to Washington, D.C., attorney
James Bikoff. Conference, supra note 106, at 462.
113 P. Stem, Remarks at the National Conference on Counterfeiting, Foreign Product
Counterfeiting (June 27, 1985) (available in LI VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, No. 22, at
675).
114 SUBCOMMrrrEE, supra note 13, at 4.
115 P. Stem, supra note 113, at 675.
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of the United States International Trade Commission, suggested
that a "product cycle" occurs where counterfeiters in developing
countries begin in counterfeiting, and then evolve into legitimate
operations and begin to manufacture their own trademarks, ironi-
cally incurring their own counterfeiting problems. 116 Counterfeits
produced from economically developed countries remain a problem
as well.' 1
7
To underscore its desire to eradicate international counterfeit-
ing, the United States has codified its desire to negotiate with for-
eign governments over the enactment and enforcement of
trademark laws within their countries."18 To stem the tide of coun-
terfeit goods entering the country, the United States government
has taken steps to work within the international framework. The
first step in international efforts was joining the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property ("Paris Convention")." 19
The ninety-nine member Paris Convention has provided a founda-
tion for minimal protection against trademark counterfeiting
120
through provisions which prohibit the use, registration, and impor-
tation of confusing trademarks, and sanction their seizure and for-
feiture where allowed by national law. 121 The Paris Convention
does not mandate that a signatory country follow specific guidelines;
it merely requires that the country grant the same trademark protec-
tion to other signatory members as it does to its own nationals, 122 a
standard that provides little relief to trademark owners in countries
with few anti-counterfeiting laws. Thus, the United States must look
to other international sources to protect trademark owners and con-
sumers from counterfeiting.
116 Id. Paula Stern states:
Producers in the developing countries counterfeit established trademarks to get a
foothold in the market, since demand for certain trademarked items exceeds the
capacity of legitimate licensees. As trade increases and the trademark owners coun-
terattack, there is a shift to the "gray" areas of deception. Finally the counterfeiters
develop their own trademarks or acquire legitimate licenses .... The irony is that
the former counterfeiters then may become the target of new counterfeiters.
Id.
117 Comment, The Private Sector Combats Products Counterfeiting, 8 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
CoMP. LJ. 699, 702 (1986) (citing Italy as a source of counterfeit goods).
118 19 U.S.C.A. § 2901(10) (West 1988).
119 Paris Convention for Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1888, as revised
at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, T.I.A.S. No.
6903, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
120 Schuyler, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property-A View of the Proposed
Revisions, 8 N.CJ. INT'L & COM. REG. 155, 166 (1982).
121 Rakoff & Wolff, supra note 20, at 176.
122 Kunz-Hallstein, The United States Proposal for a Gatt Agreement on Intellectual Property
and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
265, 273 (1989).
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One such source is the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion ("WIPO"),123 which became a specialized United Nations
agency in 1974,124 and oversees the Paris Convention and thirteen
other agreements involving industrial and intellectual property.
125
WIPO has a committee of experts which meets annually to discuss
measures aimed at fighting trademark counterfeiting. During one
such conference, the committee formulated a draft model provision
of an anti-counterfeiting code.1 26 The committee of experts hoped
that the provision would direct attention to the counterfeiting prob-
lem, and provide countries with information that would aid in the
implementation of national anti-counterfeiting laws.' 27 The WIPO
was unable to develop a final set of provisions, however, in part be-
cause of disagreement between delegates over how they should in-
corporate the Paris Convention into the new draft.128 Such discord,
especially between developing and industrial countries, continually
threatens the potential of ever creating an anti-counterfeiting code
123 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S. No. 6932, 828 U.N.T.S. 3. The organization had 123
countries as ofJanuary, 1989. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation, cited in 28 INDUS. PROP. (BNA) 5 (Jan., 1989).
124 L. HENKIN, R.C. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMrr, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1389 (2d ed.
1987) [hereinafter HENKIN].
125 Id. at 1389-90.
126 Committee of Experts on Measures Against Counterfditing and Piracy, 27 INDUS. PROP.
(BNA) 332 (Sept., 1988) [hereinafter Measures Against Counterfeiting]. The relevant por-
tions of the draft model provisions read as follows:
(1) Manufacturing as an Act of Counterfeiting. The manufacturing, or the prepara-
tion of the manufacturing, of goods
(i) that bear, or are accompanied by, a two-dimensional sign (word(s), letter(s),
number(s), color(s), graphic representation(s), etc.), or whose form or pack-
aging consists of three-dimensional features, that is or are a reproduction or
a slavish or near-slavish imitation of a protected two dimensional or three-
dimensional trademark, provided that the goods are of the same or a similar
kind as any of the goods for which the trademark is protected or, even where
the goods are of a different kind, that there is a danger of confusion regard-
ing the origin of the goods...
... shall constitute an act of counterfeiting, provided that such goods
are manufactured on a commercial scale and without the authorization of
the owner of the right in the trademark ....
Id. (emphasis omitted). According to one WIPO participant, the draft code's definition
of counterfeiting is too vague as it incorporates mere infringements as well as true coun-
terfeits of trademarks. Such a definition threatens the progress of the negotiations
within the WIPO on trademark counterfeiting. Committee of Experts Fails to Agree on Model
Legislation to Fight Counterfeiting, Piracy, 5 INr'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 721, 722 (May 18,
1988) [hereinafter Committee Fails to Agree].
127 Measures Against Counterfeiting, supra note 126, at 331.
128 Committee Fails to Agree, supra note 126, at 721-22 (such disagreements stemmed
from fundamentally different perceptions of the problem of trademark counterfeiting
among member nations).
COMMENT
through WIPO. 129 WIPO 130 participates in the intellectual property
negotiations at the current meeting of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").13 ' GATT is both an international
agreement and a dispute resolution organization of which the
United States is a signatory. GATT has sponsored seven tarriff and
trade negotiations.' 32 At the current GATT meeting, called the
Uraguay round, which began in the fall of 1986, the United States is
attempting to negotiate for "a consensus among GATT members to
honor intellectual property laws and enforce such laws domestically
as well as internationally."'' 33 More specifically, the United States'
goal is the implementation of intellectual property obligations in
GATT, and the creation of better dispute resolution methods neces-
sary to enforce such rights.
34
The United States, Japan, and the European Economic Com-
munity are currently supporting measures designed to achieve an
agreement among the members of GATT on the creation and en-
forcement of laws designed to protect intellectual property in both
domestic and international markets.' 35 However, a group of mostly
developing countries, led by Brazil, is resisting a GATT intellectual
property accord, asserting that WIPO is the proper forum for such
agreements 3 6 and that bringing in intellectual property issues
would distract GATT from its other tasks. i3 7 The United States
maintains that it would support a WIPO accord if it adhered to the
129 U.S. Making Progress in Convincing Other Nations to Improve Rights Protection Laws, 4
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 557 (April 22, 1987) [hereinafter U.S. Making Progress]
("[d]eveloping country opposition to intellectual property rights protection has limited
the effectiveness of the World Intellectual Property Organization").
130 Gatt Negotiating Group Sets Talks This Week on U.S. Proposal, WIPO WillJoin Discussion,
4 Ir'n TRADE REP. (BNA) 1358, 1359 (Nov. 4, 1987). Then commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks Donald Quigg said, "Washington 'recommends strongly that the
[WIPO] representation at the GATT talks be at the highest level possible. The partici-
pation by WIPO or its director general in the GATT operation does not in any respect
mean that WIPO should abandon its own programs.'" Id. In contrast, "[s]peaking on
behalf of the so-called 'Group of 77,' Cuba said WIPO alone is the forum for discussion
of trademarks, counterfeiting, and patents, and that GATT should not be involved." Id.
These differences of opinion threaten to hamper the role of WIPO in GATT negotia-
tions. Key Players Jockey for Position on Farm Talks as Meeting Begins, 5 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1587, 1588 (Dec. 7, 1988)[hereinafter Key Players].
131 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5) A3, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
132 HENKIN, supra note 124, at 1166.
133 Key Players, supra note 130, at 1588.
134 19 U.S.C. § 2901(10) (1988).
135 EC Presents Detailed Proposal For GATT Coverage of Intellectual Property Rights, 5 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1012 (July 13, 1988).
136 Key Players, supra note 130, at 1588.
137 The tasks include improving upon existing GATT measures. Comment, Countering
International Trade in Counterfeit Goods, 12 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 339, 354 n.126 (1986)
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Uruguay round timetable-meaning a completed agreement by
1990.138 Due to the differences among developing and developed
countries,1 39 any agreement on counterfeiting may be beyond the
realm of GATT.
But, even if a GATT agreement is reached in the current round
of negotiations, it will be slow to take effect.1 40 Furthermore, it or
any other international agreement may not be enforced by the coun-
tries that have most of the counterfeiting because of their general
opposition. Thus, international efforts by the United States to se-
cure the protection of trademarks from counterfeiting, through in-
ternational conventions and organizations, may be stymied
altogether by the countries that foster counterfeiting.
C. UNILATERAL EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SPHERE
The United States does have some unilateral negotiating lever-
age when dealing with individual countries with a counterfeiting
problem. The Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"),14 1 for
instance, grants duty-free treatment to certain products of develop-
ing countries. Investigations into developing countries receiving
GSP benefits are conducted by the United States Trade Representa-
tive ("USTR") upon its own initiative, or through petitions from pri-
vate parties.142 Upon an annual review, GSP treatment can be
suspended, withheld, or withdrawn if it is discovered through an in-
vestigation that a developing country does not adequately safeguard
intellectual property rights.143 For instance, the President, upon the
USTR's recommendation and investigation, denied Thailand's re-
(citing MINUTES OF G.A.T.T. MEETING OF 20 Nov., 1984, G.A.T.T. Doc. C/M/183, at
29).
The developing countries have other fears:
These countries have also expressed the fear that anticounterfeit rules would be
used by industrialized countries as a protectionist measure, thereby limiting impor-
tation of legitimate goods.... It was also reported that several developing nations
took the view that the enactment of anti-counterfeiting rules within G.A.T.T. would
simply reinforce the power of multinational corporations.
Id.
138 Key Players, supra note 130, at 1588.
139 Comment, supra note 137, at 354 n.126.
140 U.S. Making Progress, supra note 129, at 557.
141 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1988). The Caribbean Basin Initiative, 19 U.S.C. § 2702
(1988), provides benefits similar to those in GSP to Caribbean and some Central Ameri-
can nations. Trademark counterfeiting, however, has not been a major problem in those
areas to date.
142 President Reagan Denies Thailand Larger GSP Benefits, Citing Intellectual Property Record, 6
INr'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 96, 97 (Jan. 25, 1989) [hereinafter Thailand].
143 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c)(3)(B)(ii).
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quest for additional duty-free status because of its failure to provide
adequate intellectual property laws.144 Such a denial is supposed to
encourage the country to improve its protection of intellectual
property. Denying GSP benefits will not be as effective a tool as it
once was, however, because some of the most notorious counterfeit-
ing nations, including Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singa-
pore, have been removed from duty-free treatment because "'their
recent improvements in competitiveness'" demonstrate that they
do not need such assistance. 145 These countries represented sixty
percent of all U.S. GSP eligible benefits.' 46 Thus, the effectiveness
of withholding GSP benefits has diminished considerably.
Remedies under section 301 of the amended Trade Act of
197414 7 are a more effective leverage tool in that the USTR can im-
pose import duties' 48 or suspend trade agreement concessions 49
with any country that does not adequately protect intellectual prop-
erty rights.1 50 Such penalties are a proven leverage tool for gaining
intellectual property rights. For example, in 1985, the USTR self-
initiated an investigation into the protection of patents and copy-
rights in South Korea.' 5 ' After consultations with the USTR, South
Korea responded with tougher intellectual property laws. 152 A de-
termination to take any action is made after the USTR's investiga-
tion, a53 prompted by its own impetus or the petition of an interested
party.' 54 Actions taken upon these determinations are subject to
the specific direction of the President of the United States. 55
Another leverage tool that trademark owners can turn to are
the provisions of section 337 of the amended Tariff Act of 1930,156
144 Thailand, supra note 142, at 96.
145 Four Pacific Rim Nations Are Graduated from GSP Status, 35 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHTJ. (BNA) 282 (Feb. 11, 1988).
146 Id. at 283 ("Balanced against economic considerations of the sizeable duty-free
imports here, preserving GSP status for these countries could no longer be justified.").
147 Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 1301-1307, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164-1184 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. 93 2411- 2419 (1988)) (commonly known as section 301
authority).
148 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(B).
149 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(A).
150 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(II).
151 Retaliation Under Section 301, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER'S U.S. IMPORT
WEEKLY REFERENCE FILE (BNA) 60 (May, 5 1988) (Section 301 Table of Cases, Office of
the USTR).
152 Id.
153 19 U.S.C. § 2412. Certain findings require mandatory action. 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
154 19 U.S.C. § 2412.
155 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii).
156 Pub. L. 100-418, § 1341, 102 Stat. 1107, 1211 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337 (1988)). Relevant sections of the elements that a complainant must establish to
gain relief read as follows:
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which allows for the exclusion from the United States 57 or the for-
feiture or both of goods deemed counterfeit. 158 The International
Trade Commission ("ITC") conducts investigations under section
337 on its own impetus or through a sworn complaint from the
trademark owner. 159 The ITC's swift proceedings 160 and avoidance
of the usual jurisdictional and enforcement problems often present
in suits against foreign entities 16 1 are distinct advantages to a trade-
mark owner. In addition, a trademark owner can pursue other legal
actions simultaneously in the courts, as well as through the ITC
under section 337, and is not precluded from suing in another fo-
rum if relief is denied. 162 Although the ability to maintain an action
in the courts and through the ITC may seem like a powerful weapon
in theory, in practice it may prove too expensive for the trademark
owner to maintain both actions. As with GSP and section 301 ac-
tions, a valid complaint taken up with the ITC may be stymied by the
whims of foreign policy as the President of the United States retains
a veto power over any action. 16
3
None of the three aforementioned unilateral measures have
been imposed with any frequency to trademark counterfeiting.
Even if they were, it is difficult to compel the enforcement of a new
law: if the country does attempt to uphold the new law, then coun-
terfeiters may merely move to a country where the laws are less
stringent. 164 Even the United States, for example, has problems en-
(a) (I) (A) Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of arti-
cles.., into the United States, or in the sale of such articles by the owner, iinporter,
or consignee, the threat of which is-
(i) to destroy or substantially injure an industry in the United States;
(ii) to prevent the establishment of such an industry ; or
(iii) to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States....
... (C) The importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the sale
within the United States after importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of arti-
cles that infringe a valid and enforceable United States trademark registered under the
Trademark Act of 1946.
Id.
"The elimination of an injury requirement [proving an injury to a U.S. industry] in
1988 for cases involving infringment of... trademarks ... left the issues of infringement
and establishment of valid and enforceable intellectual property rights as the major re-
quirements for obtaining relief." ITC Protective Actions, INTERNATIONAL TRADE RE-
PORTER'S U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY REFERENCE FILE (BNA) 131 (Sept. 28, 1988) (Analysis)
[hereinafter ITC Protective].
157 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e).
158 19 U.S.C. § 1337(i).
159 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b).
160 ITC Protective, supra note 156, at 131.
161 P. Stem, supra note 113, at 676.
162 Id.
163 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j).
164 Finn, supra note 12, at 4 1; East Asian Countries Strengthen Intellectual Property Protection,
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forcing its anti-counterfeiting laws. Another problem is that world-
wide counterfeiting networks sometimes employ sophisticated dis-
tribution techniques.1 65 Most countries probably have neither the
sophistication nor the resources to uncover the discrete role that
their country serves in an international counterfeiting scheme, or
the standing to prosecute all the participants. For instance, in one
perfume counterfeiting ring, "the bottles came from Italy and Spain,
packaging was done in Mexico and England, and the money came
from the United States through the Channel Islands."' 66 Thus, the
end result is that pressuring individual countries through unilateral
efforts may not make much of a dent in an international problem.
Furthermore, unilateral remedies tend to antagonize the
targeted countries. 167 The United States faces problems with these
remedies at the GATT negotiations. A GATT panel has already de-
termined that section 337 is inconsistent with GATT's equanimity
principles in its "failure to provide identical procedures and stan-
dards for the enforcement of patent rights for domestic and foreign-
produced goods,"'168 and section 301 will probably suffer the same
fate soon. 169 The adverse reactions by many countries to these uni-
lateral methods at GATT may compel the United States to modify
sections 337170 and 301 in the interest of reaching an agreement. At
a minimum, it may lead the President to exercise his veto more fre-
quently over such unilateral actions in order to avoid more confron-
tations while GATT negotiations proceed. Thus, the potency of
unilateral remedies, hampered already by the sophistication of
counterfeiters, is in danger of being further compromised.
D. CUSTOMS
United States Customs 17 1 enforces most of the unilateral penal-
32 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) 38, 39 (May 8, 1986) [hereinafter East Asian]
(statement by Stephen F. Sims, staff member of the House Energy and Commerce Sub-
committee on Oversight and Investigations).
165 Comment, supra note 117, at 701 (documenting the presence of a large and so-
phisticated international trademark counterfeiting ring).
166 Chiles, supra note 9, at 38.
167 According to Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration ofJustice, and David Beier, Coun-
sel to the Committee of the Judiciary: "[m]any trade specialists view this type of unilat-
eral retaliation as antithetical to the multilateral trade system because it creates a
significant risk of similar unilateral action against the United States." Kastenmeier &
Beier, International Trade and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 285, 299 (1989).
168 Id. at 298.
169 Beier, Remarks of David Beier, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 333, 336 (1989).
170 Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note 167, at 298.
171 See 19 C.F.R. § 12.39 (1988).
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ties, including exclusion and forfeiture orders, and in general serves
as a last defense to counterfeit imports from abroad. The agency,
however, searches a low percentage of imported goods to check for
fakes.' 72 Despite limited success with seizures, 173 investigations, 74
and recent court decisions, 175 counterfeiters can usually evade cus-
toms. 176 For example, counterfeiters often import goods without
labels and then attach them once they are in the country. 177
The key to effectively implementing the customs regulations 178
is for private companies to ensure that their goods are registered
with customs, and to educate customs officials as to what their genu-
ine goods look like and how they are usually counterfeited.1 79 The
Customs service itself employs an interdisciplinary approach to en-
forcement through a program called "The Fraud Center," which in-
172 Chiles, supra note 9, at 39 (In 1985, of the 1.5 million containers that entered Los
Angeles area ports, Customs searched only 2-5%o thoroughly.).
173 Id. ($35 million in counterfeit goods seized in 1985); Counterfeit Goods ValuedAt $7.6
Million Seized, 4 Imr'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 593 (April 4, 1987) ($7.6 million seized in first
six months of fiscal 1987).
174 Threat of Substandard Nuts, Bolts, Screws Probed by House Energy and Commerce Panel, 4
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1010, 1011 (Aug. 12, 1987) (William Rosenblatt, then Assistant
Commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service Office of Enforcement, reports on efforts to
stem counterfeit fastener trade).
175 See, e.g., United States v. Watches, 692 F. Supp. 1317 (S. D. Fla. 1988) (Fully oper-
ational watch bodies, absent the faces bearing counterfeit trademarks, are still seizable
counterfeit mechandise.).
176 Chiles, supra note 9, at 39. Cf Watches, 692 F. Supp. at 1317.
177 Chiles, supra note 9, at 39-40.
178 United States Customs Service Regulations, 19 C.F.R. § 133.23(a) (1988). The
following are relevant sections of the Customs service regulations dealing with counter-
feit goods:
Articles bearing counterfeit trademarks:
(a) Definition. A "counterfeit trademark" is a spurious trademark which is identical
with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered trademark.
(b) Seizure. Any Article imported into the United States bearing a counterfeit
trademark shall be seized and, in the absence of written consent from the trade-
mark owner, forfeited for violation of the Customs laws.
(c) Notice to trademark owner. The owner of the trademark shall be notified of the
seizure and the quantity of the articles seized. Unless the trademark owner,
within 30 days of notification, provides written consent to importation of the
articles, exportation, entry after obliteration of the trademark, or other appro-
priated disposition, the article shall be disposed of in accordance with § 133.52,
subject to the importer's right to petition for relief from the forfeiture under the
provisions of Part 171 of this chapter.
Id.
The following relevant sections of 19 C.F.R. § 133.52(a) (1988), pertain to the dis-
posal of counterfeit merchandise: "The Commissioner of Customs or his designee shall
dispose of forfeited articles bearing a counterfeit trademark after obliteration of trade-
mark, where feasible, in the following manner: (1) Government Use . . . (2) Gifts to
Charity ... (3) Sale ... (4) Destruction .... Id.
179 Chiles, supra note 9, at 39 (Apple Computer provided customs inspectors with kits
to identify counterfeits of its trademarks and copyrights.).
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volves coordinated operations with agents from the FBI, FDA, and
other governmental agencies. 180 The agency has the right to confis-
cate and destroy counterfeits of goods registered with customs.' 8 1
With the trade volume so high, however, and the difficulty of
distinguishing the counterfeit from the authentic, customs agents do
not at present have the ability to halt most of the importation of
counterfeit goods. The understaffing of custom's agents at domestic
ports, because of budget constraints, is a major factor contributing
to this inability.182 Furthermore, according to Patrick O'Brien, then
assistant regional commissioner for United States Customs in New
York, trademark counterfeiting is "not our No. 1 priority"-it is the
number four priority "[after] narcotics, technology exporting and
illegal arms sales."' 183
Another problem concerns the understaffing of the Customs
Bureau abroad, particularly in counterfeiting hotspots of the Pacific
rim. Agents abroad can help identify incoming shipments of coun-
terfeit goods to the United States through undercover investigations
and other activities and can work with foreign governments in stem-
ming the tide of such illegal shipments. The Bureau is understaffed
abroad because of both the reluctance of many United States embas-
sies to hold open one of their personnel slots for a customs officer
and general budget cuts. 184 Thus, it seems that trademark owners
cannot rely on the customs service to adequately protect their trade-
marks from international counterfeiting, even with the cooperation
of the trademark owners themselves.
E. EFFORTS OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY AND THE GOVERNMENT TO FIGHT
INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING
Recognizing that government options are either untested or
unreliable, many private trademark owners have united in private
international organizations that attempt to fight counterfeiting.' 85
180 Telephone interview withJim Wilson, United States Customs Agent, Chicago Re-
gional Office (Feb. 20, 1989).
181 See supra note 178, § 133.52(a).
182 Subcommittee, supra note 13, at 23.
183 Foltz, A Plague of Counterfeit Goods, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 1984 at 69; Chiles, supra
note 9, at 39.
And even with those containers that do get the inspector's scrutiny, counterfeiters
don't take first priority. Each inspector wears hundreds of hats: watching for agri-
cultural fungi and pests, challenging import classifications that attempt to sneak
products into the country without payment of duties and looking for contraband
guns and narcotics.
Chiles, supra note 9, at 39.
184 East Asian, supra note 164, at 39.
185 One such organization is the San Francisco-based International Anti-Counterfeit-
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Private industry also partially financed and participated in a joint
conference with the United States Government in Taiwan that was
designed to stem the flow of counterfeits from that country. 186 The
seminar, which focused on the enforcement of intellectual property
rights, was the result of two years of planning by United States gov-
ernment officials and private industry. 187 The seminar included
prominent members of the Taiwanese judicial and law enforcement
agencies. 188 Wide publicity of the event in the media and the exten-
sive participation by Taiwanese officials helped to accomplish the
seminar's goal of setting an agenda to address United States compa-
nies' concerns. 189 Future seminars have been planned in other ar-
eas of East Asia. 190
The success of such a seminar program in terms of stemming
counterfeiting remains to be proven, but the participation and inter-
est of the Taiwanese demonstrate some potential for the success of
such a non-confrontational approach. Seminars may well prove
more successful than the United States government's attempts to
pressure nations through sections 301 and 337 or through GSP ac-
tions. Such pressure tactics may just entrench those developing na-
tions that do not favor heavy-handed treatment. Once again,
however, it may be beyond the capabilities of developing countries
to combat the problem given the scope of the counterfeiting trade.
To be successful, such conferences must include the participation
and cooperation of all or at least most of the developing countries
where there is a counterfeiting problem, lest the counterfeiters just
move from country to country. The failures and uncertainty of in-
ternational efforts to curb the importation of counterfeit goods
places emphasis on the enforcement of domestic anti-counterfeiting
laws.
ing Coalition ("IAC"). With a membership of over 300 major manufacturers, the IAC
has successfully pressured Congress into giving customs officials the right to seize sus-
pected counterfeit goods. Fleming, The Bogus Brands Boom, WORLD PRESS REv., Apr.,
1985, at 50. It was also very active in the formulation of model drafts for the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act. Rakoff & Wolff, supra note 20, at 147 n. 12. Another organization,
"[t]he Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which has 7,000 member
corporations and associations in 100 countries, has created a Counterfeiting Intelligence
Bureau. With a staff of three investigators and an annual budget of $65,000, the bureau
will attempt to track down counterfeiters for its clients." Fleming, supra, at 50. Such a
small budget and staff, however, will probably undercut the effectiveness of this bureau.
186 Hardee, Seminar in Taipei Launches Second Phase of U.S. Efforts to Secure Improved Protec-
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F. STATE CRIMINAL LAWS FOR TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING
Today a majority of the states have some type of criminal pen-
alty' 9 1 for trademark counterfeiting. 192 At present, criminal sanc-
tions vary significantly in the scope of their anti-trademark
counterfeiting provisions. For instance, some states penalize the
crime as a misdemeanor while other states term it a felony. 193 In a
recent case, and one of the few that is reported, the Supreme Court
of Utah in State v. Frampton 194 affirmed the conviction of a counter-
feiter for two counts of criminal simulation, 195 including third-de-
gree felony and Class B misdemeanor for the sale of counterfeit
191 In 1845, New York established the first anti-counterfeiting statute in the country.
Pattishall, supra note 24, at 461.
192 The following state codes classify trademark counterfeiting as a felony: ALA. CODE
§ 13A-8-10.4 (1987); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.530 (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2004
(1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-37-213 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 350 (West 1988); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:229 (West 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-24-01, 12.1-24-02,
12.1-24-03 (1987); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.32 (Baldwin 1989); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-6-518 (1988).
The following state codes classify trademark counterfeiting as a misdemeanor:
ALA. CODE § 13A-8-10.4 (1987); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.530 (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§§ 44-1454, 44-1456 (1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-37-213 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 350, 351(a) (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-110 (1986 & Supp. 1988); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-141 (West 1985); D.C. CODE § 22-1402 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 831.03 (West 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 482-4, 482-5 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-
3614, 18-3615 (1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 140, para. 25, § 3, para. 26, § 4 (1988); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 705 (1988); MD. CRIM. LAw CODE ANN., § 195 (1988); MicH.
STAT. ANN. § 429.43 (Callaghan 1988); MINN. STAT. § 333.42 (1988); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-21-53 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-318 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-606
(1988); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 205.205, 205.210 (1988); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C: 21-2 (1988);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 170.45 (McKinney 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-01 (1987); OR.
REV. STAT. § 647.125, 647.991 (1987); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4102 (1988 & Supp. 1989);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 37-6-2, 3 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-923, 47-25-513
(1988); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 32.22 (Vernon 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-
518, 76-10-1003 (1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2530-2531 (1988); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-214 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.16.030, 9.16.040 (1988); W. VA. CODE §§ 47-
2-3, 47-2-6, 47-2-7 (1988); Wis. STAT. § 132.03 (1988).
The following states have no applicable criminal law: Delaware, Georgia, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Wyoming. This compilation of
state anti-counterfeiting codes is an updated and modified version of a compilation that
appeared in Correll, Using Criminal Sanctions to Combat Trademark Counterfeiting, 14 AM.
INTELL. PROP. L. A. Q.J. 278, 290-317 (1986).
193 Id.
194 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987).
195 Id. at 185-86. " 'The criminal simulation statute is essentially a forgery statute
which extends beyond the forgery of written documents and instruments.'" Id. at 192
(quoting MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES, Part II, § 224.2 at 307 (American Law
Institute)). The pertinent portions of the Utah simulation statute governing this case
read as follows:
"(1) A person is guilty of criminal simulation if, with intent to defraud another:
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baseball gloves. 196 In this case, Wilson Sporting Goods initiated a
complaint with the local police, which conducted an undercover in-
vestigation of the local retailer selling the counterfeit gloves.19 7 The
defendant argued that he should have been prosecuted under the
counterfeit trademark statute l9 8 instead of the simulation statute.
The court ruled against a restrictive reading of the criminal simula-
tion statute that would limit the statute to unique chattels, such as
paintings or antiques, and held that there was nothing in the lan-
guage of the statute which barred its application to the altering of a
modern, commercially manufactured product.' 99 More precisely,
the 'court said that the simulation statute was designed to protect the
consumer, and as such should be construed broadly to include a
variety of product counterfeiting. 200 The court followed the sugges-
tions of the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute.
20 1
Similarly in People v. Hafif, 202 the New York Criminal Court
held that the wording of a criminal simulation statute, similar to the
one in Frampton, may extend to include watches and other commer-
cially mass-produced items, including the falsely stamped jewelry in
this case. 203 The court stated that the statute was geared toward
forgery of written documents and instruments, but was extended to
cover "'fraudulent simulation of furniture, paintings, jewels, and
(a) He makes or alters an object in whole or in part so that it appears to
have value because of age, antiquity, rarity, source, or authorship that it does
not have; or
(b) He sells, passes, or otherwise utters an object so made or altered; or
(c) He possesses an object so made or altered with intent to sell, pass, or
otherwise utter it; or
(d) He authenticates or certifies an object so made or altered as genuine
or as different from what it is.
(2) Criminal simulation is punishable as follows:
(a) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded is less than $100,
the offense is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded exceeds $100 but
is less than $1,000, the offense is a class A misdemeanor.
(c) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded exceeds $1,000
but is less than $2,500, the offense is a felony of the third degree.
(d) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded exceeds $2,500,
the offense is a felony of the second degree."
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-518 (1978), quoted in Frampton, 737 P.2d at 185.
196 Frampton, 737 P.2d'at 186.
197 Id.
198 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1003 (1984). The maximum penalty under this provi-
sion is a misdemeanor, whereas under § 76-6-518 it is a felony.
199 Frampton, 737 P.2d at 192.
200 Id. at 192-93.
201 Id. at 192 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part II, § 224.2, at 307
(American Law Institute)).
202 128 Misc. 2d 713, 491 N.Y.S.2d 226 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1985).
203 Id. at 714, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
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other objects.' ",204 The court also stated that "the purpose of the
statute is to protect consumers." 20 5
Frampton and Hafif represent the total number of reported state
trademark counterfeiting cases for at least the last fourteen years.
206
There are undoubtedly unreported opinions, including cases where
the defendant plea bargained.207 Nevertheless, such a small
number of reported cases strongly suggests that the state statutes
criminalizing trademark counterfeiting are underused. According
to Craig 0. Correll, then Associate General Counsel of Ocean Pa-
cific, Ltd., "[1]ocal police agencies and prosecutors are unfamiliar
with these laws. Enforcement of obscure criminal codes is discre-
tionary; law enforcement agencies can and do decline to become in-
volved." 208 Moreover, many district attorneys do not realize that
trademark counterfeiting is a criminal offense; it is difficult to con-
vince them to devote their resources to something they consider a
civil matter.20
9
Most of the burden thus falls on the trademark owner to
achieve results under state statutes. The trademark owner, how-
ever, does not normally have the same training or expertise in inves-
tigating criminals as do the local law enforcement agents. In fact,
"very few manufacturers of trademarked goods employ in-house
counsel and investigators to deal with their counterfeiting
problems," 210 and outside counsel to trademark owners tend to use
civil remedies with which they are more accustomed.21' The state
anti-counterfeiting criminal laws thus fall short of protecting con-
sumers and trademark owners alike from counterfeiters.
204 Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part II, § 224.2, at 306-307
(American Law Institute)).
205 Hafif, 128 Misc. 2d at 714, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
206 Several cases, however, have upheld convictions under various state statutes
criminalizing the sale of counterfeit controlled substances over the last 14 years. See,
e.g., Ohio v. Mughni, 33 Ohio St. 3d 65, 514 N.E.2d 870 (1987); Skinner v. State, 182
Ga. App. 370, 355 S.E.2d 726 (1987).
207 Correll, supra note 192, at 287 (vast majority of cases will be resolved short of
trial).
208 Id. at 289; see also Chiles, supra note 9, at 41 (counterfeiters do not usually go to jail
because prosecutors do not want to take the time to push for prison sentences). Correll
suggests that the "trademark owner who wishes to bring a criminal action should be
willing to assist the agency when requested. This includes promptly returning phone
calls and providing a quick means of communication between the trademark owner and
the sheriff or police department handling the case." Correll, supra note 192, at 289. An
innovative approach is the use of citizens' arrests at flea markets, but even this remedy
may leave the trademark owner subject to a wrongful arrest suit. Id. at 281-82.
209 Id. at 289.
210 Id. at 284.
211 Id. at 286.
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G. IMPROVED CIVIL REMEDIES UNDER THE TRADEMARK
COUNTERFEITING ACT OF 1984
Considering the lack of enforcement under the criminal provi-
sions of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act and the lack of effective-
ness of the international, federal, and state alternatives, the civil
provisions of the Lanham Act2 1 2 would appear to bear considerable
importance in the fight against trademark counterfeiting. Yet here
the effectiveness of the civil provisions are diluted by their monetary
cost and by the incongruity of civil provisions combating a criminal
problem.
The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984213 gave the Lanham
Act stronger tools to fight counterfeiting by codifying ex parte
seizures214 and by mandating treble damages 215 in counterfeiting
cases. The question remains whether such measures adequately
thwart trademark counterfeiting. For example, courts will grant ex
parte seizure orders only if the applicant makes the required proofs
and abides by certain limitations.2 16 The applicant must demon-
strate through a sworn affidavit that "an order other than an ex
parte seizure order is not adequate";2 1 7 the action has not been
publicized;218 a likelihood of success in showing that the defendant's
marks used in connection with a sale or distribution of goods are
counterfeit; 219 an immediate and irreparable injury will occur with-
out the seizure; 220 the counterfeit goods will be at the place identi-
212 Prior to the passage of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, the civil reme-
dies vested in the Lanham Act-the basic federal statute covering trademark registra-
tions and infringement suits-did not adequately stem the tide of trademark
counterfeiting. Rakoff & Wolff, supra note 20, at 163. The remedies leveled against
counterfeiters included equitable injunctive relief, including a provision for treble dam-
ages in "exceptional cases." Id. Judges tended to view all disputes under the Lanham
Act as good faith disputes between commercial entities, which the majority of regular
infringement disputes are. Id. Thus, courts were reluctant to grant treble damages, or
ex parte seizure orders, even if warranted by blatant counterfeiting. Id. Counterfeiters
usually keep their goods on hand in a readily mobile state (so that any notice would tip
them off and the goods would quickly disappear) thus making an ex parte seizure partic-
ularly necessary. In re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1979).
213 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1503, 98 Stat. 2179, 2180 (amending The Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1116-1118 (1988)).
214 15 U.S.C. at § 1116 (d)(1)(a).
215 15 U.S.C. at § 1117(b); See Louis Vuitton v. After Dark Boutique, 680 F. Supp.
1507 (N.D. Fla. 1988) (an award of treble damages and reasonable attorney's fees in a
trademark counterfeiting case under the revised Lanham Act).
216 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d).
217 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(i).
218 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(ii) (a restriction that affects the deterrent effect of the
seizure and is not present in criminal actions).
219 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(iii).
220 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(iv). Such injury is a routinely easy element to prove
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fled;2 2 1 the harm to the trademark owner from the counterfeiting
outweighs the potential harm of the seizure to the person against
whom it is ordered;222 and the defendant with notice would "de-
stroy, move, hide, or otherwise make such matter inaccessible to the
court. '"223 An applicant can satisfy the "inaccessible" element by
describing the defendant's past efforts to avoid judicial process.
224
"The Act follows the prior practice of allowing seizure orders to be
issued against 'John Doe' defendants when the sellers of counterfeit
goods are transitory, unidentifiable defendants, such as itinerant
street peddlers and sellers at swap meets and flea markets."
225
Besides the counterfeit goods, the applicant also can seize the
counterfeiter's "means of making such marks, and records docu-
menting the manufacture, sale, or receipt of things involved. ' 22
6
Such records help in proving the case against the defendant and in
discovering the scope of the counterfeiting, which may in turn lead
to seizures and suits against other identified counterfeiters. Reason-
able prior notice of the seizure must also be afforded the local
United States Attorney.2 27 In addition, a bond must be posted to
cover the possibility of a wrongful seizure.228 A victim who suffers
damage from a wrongful seizure can recover "lost profits, cost of
the materials, loss of good will and punitive damages in instances
where the seizure was sought in bad faith, and, unless the court
finds extenuating circumstances ... a reasonable attorney's fee." 2 29
The court also has the option of awarding prejudgment interest.
230
Thus, the trademark owner must conduct a careful investigation of
once the applicant establishes the use of a counterfeit mark. Smith, Obtaining Early and
Effective Relief Against Trademark Counterfeiting, 10 COMMENT LJ. 1049, 1061 (1988).
221 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(v).
222 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(vi).
223 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(vii).
224 Joint Statement, supra note 2, at H12081.
225 Smith, supra note 220, at 1061-62.
226 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A).
227 15 U.S.C. at § 11 16(d)(2). Notifying the United States Attorney of an impending
seizure provides him or her with the opportunity to participate in the action, or request
the denial of the seizure where an ongoing criminal investigation may be disrupted.
Smith, supra note 20, at 1061; see also Fanning, Rambo & Rambo Attorneys-at-Law, FORBES,
Jan. 26, 1987, at 76 (notice is often received too late).
228 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(A).
229 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11).
230 15 U.S.C. § 11 16(d)(1 1). The counterfeit goods must be seized by a United States
marshall or other law enforcement official. 15 U.S.C. § 11 16(d)(9). A potential problem
might occur when there are not enough marshalls or other law enforcement personnel
to conduct the seizures. The role of the plaintiff's attorney is left to the discretion of the
court issuing the seizure order. Joint Statement, supra note 2, at H 12082. The drafters
did not include a provision sanctioning the destruction of counterfeit goods seized by
plaintiff and maintained in his or her possession, as opposed to the destruction of just
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the counterfeiter before applying for the ex parte order to avoid the
cost of a wrongful seizure.
Even though ex parte seizure has been an effective weapon in
the fight against trademark counterfeiting, 231 the success has come
with high monetary costs in the form of investigations required to
lay the groundwork for seizures and civil suits. 23 2 It is a cost that
"inhibit[s] some legitimate manufacturers from pursuing their own
actions against counterfeiters. ' 233
Mandatory treble damages in trademark counterfeiting civil
suits, therefore, would appear to be particularly useful.234 The 1984
revision to the Lanham Act states that a court shall award "three
times .. .profits or damages, whichever is greater," and a reason-
able attorney's fee against liable counterfeiters.23 5 Even though
mandatory in most cases, a court can deny such damages on the
basis of "extenuating circumstances," 23 6 thereby dampening its de-
terrent value. A court can also award the cost of investiga-
tions237and prejudgment interest 238 at its discretion.
All the damage provisions of the amended Lanham Act, how-
ever, are not as helpful as they might seem because plaintiff trade-
mark owners have difficulty collecting their judgments.23 9 For
example, counterfeiters are usually sophisticated in their attempts
to avoid detection; thus, the person actually caught selling counter-
feit goods is usually the flea market salesperson, or some other dis-
the mark itself, and only one reported decison, Fendi S.A.S. Di Paola v. Cosmetic World,
Ltd., 642 F. Supp. 1143, 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), has allowed it.
231 The ex parte seizure order has helped significantly in the fight against trademark
counterfeiting. Engardio, Companies Are Knocking Off the Knockoff Outfits, Bus. WK., Sept.
26, 1988, at 86; see also Fanning, supra note 227, at 76 (ex parte seizure used with increas-
ing frequency).
232 Bill Ellis, who runs a California detective agency that specializes in anti-counter-
feiting measures, offers advice to new entrepreneurs: " '[g]et into the market right away,
make your fortune and retire to Hawaii. It won't take long at all for the counterfeiters to
move in, and then it will take a million dollars a year for you to keep control.' " Chiles,
supra note 9, at 42. According to Izod attorney Theodore R. Voss, "'If you are very,
very active, you can keep the problem contained .... But the expense is enormous, and
you can't keep the pressure up indefinitely.'" Engardio, supra note 231, at 88.
233 Comment, supra note 117, at 705.
234 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b).
235 Id.
236 Joint Statement, supra note 2, at H12083 (It would be "highly unusual" for extenu-
ating circumstances to exist.).
237 The award of attorney's fees may also provide for the cost of investigators if they
have acted under the direction of the plaintiff's attorney. Id.
238 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b).
239 Trademark counterfeiters are elusive. "Even if a big corporation wins a big judg-
ment, collecting is difficult. Most of the pros operate with cash, leaving few assets to
garnish." Engardio, supra note 231, at 88.
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tributor at the lowest rung of the counterfeiting chain 240 who is
poor and judgement proof. Injunctive remedies are usually ineffec-
tive as well, because counterfeiters usually set up shop under a dif-
ferent front name to escape detection.2
4'
The United States Supreme Court decision in Young v. U.S. ex
rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. 2 4 2 underscored the problem of enforcing in-
junctions in trademark counterfeiting cases. In Vuitton, the defend-
ants were enjoined through an earlier civil proceeding from
counterfeiting Vuitton leather products.243 Vuitton later presented
an affidavit to the district court through its attorney alleging that
petitioners had violated the injunction by continuing to sell counter-
feit goods.2 44 The district court noted probable cause to believe the
petitioners contumacious, and appointed the private attorney who
had represented Vuitton in the original civil action to investigate
and prosecute the petitioners for criminal contempt. 245 On appeal,
the petitioners claimed that the private attorney in this situtation
was biased due to his relationship as counsel for Vuitton. 246 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, upheld the dis-
trict court's appointment of the interested prosecutor.2 47 The
Supreme Court, relying on its supervisory authority,248 reversed the
lower court decisions and held that the use of an interested prosecu-
tor was too prejudicial to allow for even a harmless error review.2 49
The Vuitton opinion is well-reasoned. It is difficult to see how
an attorney can owe an allegiance to his client without losing his
prosecutorial impartiality. Notwithstanding the merits of the case,
however, the use of an interested prosecutor in Vuitton was an un-
derstandable response by the district court and counsel for Vuitton
to the ongoing problem of enforcing contempt citations where
either the United States Attorney in his or her discretion may decide
not to take action when the case is referred to him or her from the
courts, or where a disinterested prosecutor appointed by the courts
may lack the resources, expertise, or zeal necessary to pursue a
criminal investigation. Vuitton thus underscores the general prob-
240 Id.
241 Rakoff & Wolff, supra note 20, at 165.
242 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
243 Id. at 790.
244 Id. at 791.
245 Id. at 791-92.
246 Id. at 793.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 802.
249 Id. at 810. The decision did not preclude the appointment of a disinterested pri-
vate prosecutor by the Court as an exercise of its inherent supervisory power. Id. at 800.
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lem trademark owners continue to face in relying on the effective-
ness of civil remedies against counterfeiters.
IV. THE ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS UNDER THE
TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING ACT OF 1984 - THE BEST
ATLERNATIVE
The civil, state, federal, and international alternatives to the
Act's criminal sanctions are inadequate; a criminal deterrent is
therefore necessary. The Act provides the government with the
criminal law necessary to prosecute counterfeiters. Consumers and
trademark owners alike rely on the government to enforce this law
adequately in the absence of any other remedy of equal effective-
ness. The legislators who supported the Trademark Counterfeiting
Act of 1984 recognized that "a combination of appropriate prison
terms and substantial fines will create a needed deterrent to trade-
mark counterfeiting. " 250 In 1984, however, a Justice Department
official stated baldly that, while theJustice Department would try to
maintain "a sufficient prosecution presence .... no one should ex-
pect that we are going to initiate hundreds of cases." 25 1 The prose-
cutions thus far, being so few in number,252 fall short of achieving a
sufficient presence.
Several factors contribute to the scarcity of prosecutions under
the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984. First, budgetary con-
straints affect the government's ability to conduct its fight against
trademark counterfeiting. A policy of greater enforcement, how-
ever, would practically pay for itself with tangible economic and so-
cial benefits. For instance, lost revenue 253 to counterfeiting would
be recouped and taxed, jobs would be restored, 254 and injury and
loss of life to dangerous counterfeit goods would diminish.25 5 On a
more intangible level, manufacturers would have an added incentive
to research and market new and potentially useful goods, and con-
sumers would have more confidence in the marketplace, as trade-
marks would better guarantee a consistency in the quality of goods
purchased on a repeated basis.25 6 Thus, the social and economic
benefits of a policy of greater enforcement would be manifold, and
250 Joint Statement, supra note 2, at H12077.
251 Knockoffs Won't Be Knocked Out, Bus. WE., Nov. 5, 1984, at 143.
252 See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
253 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
254 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.




with proper allocation, net cost for the government would be low.
Even as programs like the fight against drugs understandably take
precedence, trademark counterfeiting's deleterious effect on the
well-being of consumers and the economy logically dictates that it
should receive a greater than token enforcement priority from the
government.
257
The second reason that enforcement of the Act lags is that the
United States Attorneys across the country may not be fully aware of
the Act and the problems to which it is addressed. 258 Such igno-
rance will only grow worse without increased efforts from the
United States Attorneys who are aware of the scope of the Act.
259
Third, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") has adopted a
policy that places emphasis "'on criminal violations of the Trade-
mark Counterfeiting Act where the extent of criminal activity is size-
able and widespread.' "260 United States Attorneys' Offices around
the country pursue "a similar policy." 26' Unless the counterfeiting
involves organized crime rackets, or some other heinous activity, the
authorities will probably not take an interest.262 Therefore, local-
ized, discrete, but equally dangerous counterfeiting problems prob-
ably go unprosecuted.
Contributing to this lapse in prosecution is the fact that both
the FBI and the United States Attorneys' Offices 2 63 have a policy of
encouraging trademark owners to conduct their own private investi-
gations of counterfeiters. 264 This policy leads to the development
257 See supra notes 8-20 and accompanying text.
258 Bikoff, supra note 89.
259 If not unaware of the law, at the very least the lack of enforcement under the Act
suggests that government law enforcement authorities in general underestimate the
problem of trademark counterfeiting.
260 Id. (quoting Donald S. Richards, FBI Criminal Investigative Division, Remarks
before the International Anticounterfeiting Coalition, San Diego, California, May 29,
1986 (unpublished speech) [hereinafter Richards]); see also Conference, supra note 106,
at 462.
261 Richards, supra note 260.
262 According to James L. Bikoff, past president of the International Anti-Counterfeit-
ing Coalition, " 'You need to have something big, like organized crime or a tie to narcot-
ics' " in order to interest a United States Attorney in prosecuting a case under the
Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984. Engardio, supra note 231, at 88 (quoting Bikoff).
263 See Springut & Tucker, supra note 100, at 265. There are few criminal prosecu-
tions under the Act because of the following:
[T]he various United States Attorneys' offices around the country in areas where
this type of activity has historically been centered, e.g., New York, Los Angeles,
Miami, generally have had to focus their attention and resources on higher priority
matters.... Consequently, the trademark owner has been left primarily to its own
devices to protect its business and trademarks and to rid the marketplace of
counterfeits.
Id.
264 Conference, supra note 106, at 462.
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of fewer criminal cases and exposes consumers to a greater poten-
tial of being victimized by dangerous goods. To begin with, trade-
mark owners seeking a criminal sanction must typically hire
investigators to act as surrogate FBI agents,265 conducting investiga-
tions of counterfeiters and handing the results over to the United
States Attorney for prosecution. 266 Thus, criminal prosecutions
often hinge on the competence of private investigators. But not
every trademark owner can afford an extensive investigation, or the
best private investigators. Trademark owners, moreover, probably
stop short of funding an effective investigation when its cost 267 ex-
ceeds the loss to counterfeiting, or when they perceive a threat to
the reputation of their goods from such activity. 268 In general, the
private investigators and attorneys of trademark owners who ac-
tively pursue counterfeiters conceivably develop an expertise in de-
tecting the presence of counterfeit goods in the marketplace. Once
that detection is made, however, the FBI and the United States At-
torney arguably have the superior training, equipment, experience,
and authority, necessary to conduct the subsequent criminal
investigations. 26
9
The investigative skills of federal law enforcement authorities
are particularly necessary when the counterfeiting involves sophisti-
cated rings, and/or organized crime. 270 Criminals go unpunished
265 For instance, Melvin Weinberg, a former FBI employee and investigator for Vuit-
ton & Fils, the French leather goods maker, in a six-year span reportedly conducted
"1,500 raids for Vuitton and dozens of stings." Engardio, supra note 231, at 88. Stings
involve posing as a potential buyer of counterfeit goods to gather evidence for a suit or
prosecution. Id. He also reportedly developed a criminal case of tax evasion for the IRS
in which two counterfeiters received prison sentences. Id. A handful of famous investi-
gators who specialize in trademark counterfeiting, like Weinberg, are frequently quoted
in the press. Undoubtedly not many trademark owners can afford the services of such an
elite group of investigators, nor are there probably many other investigators with the
same type of experience that Weinberg culled from the FBI; he helped put together the
ABSCAM stings in 1980. Id.
266 Id.; Bikoff, supra note 89 (describing the steps to take in providing information to
the United States Attorneys' Offices).
267 See supra notes 232-233 and accompanying text.
268 Comment, supra note 117, at 704. Some trademark owners may not pursue coun-
terfeiters because of a fear "that any adverse publicity regarding the proliferation of
counterfeiting would cause the company's customers to switch to competing brands in
order to avoid purchasing one of the copied products that might be inferior in quality."
Id. at 704-05.
269 The Trademark owners' attorneys and investigtors can lend support to such inves-
tigations with information about trademarks or counterfeiters.
270 "Penetrating such [counterfeiting] syndicates may mean taking on organized
crime." Engardio, supra note 231, at 87; One attorney "ran across a stash of nitroglycer-
ine, dynamite, and automatic rifles in the Great Smoky Mountains while probing a group
selling phony HJ. Heinz Co. discount coupons." Id. at 86. James L. Bikoff, then presi-
dent of the International Anti-Counterfeiting Association, in testimony to a House Sub-
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when civil attorneys and private investigators of the trademark own-
ers fail to detect either the source or the extent of a counterfeiting
problem that the federal law enforcement agencies could have un-
covered with their expertise. Thus, the government should play a
more active role in the investigation of trademark counterfeiters, es-
pecially when the goods in question pose a danger to the public.
The possibility of losing the law's protection for their marks
through inaction provides trademark owners with an incentive to
protect their marks 27 1 with civil remedies that have some proven ef-
fectiveness. 272 It should be stressed, however, that encouraging
government protection of trademarks through criminal prosecu-
tions is not a method by which the trademark owner shifts his or her
responsibility for protection to the government. Two commenta-
tors compared the burden faced by trademark owners when coun-
terfeited with that faced by banks when robbed:
By comparison, no one supposes that merely because most banking
institutions are prosperous, bank robbery and bank embezzlement...
should be left to those bankers able to bring lawsuits against the cul-
prits. On the contrary, it is universally recognized that there is a
strong social interest in the public prosecution of such misconduct and
that without government intervention, the social cost of misconduct
would soon become insupportable.
273
While the analogy between bank robbery and trademark counter-
feiting is exaggerated, it underscores the need for government in-
tervention in the fight against trademark counterfeiting. Such
intervention is particularly necessary because a trademark counter-
feiter, like any other criminal, is likely to ignore civil process, which
relies on a certain amount of good faith between litigants. 274 The
government has an obligation to intervene when civil remedies fal-
ter, and a criminal sanction would stem a significant harm to both
consumers and trademark owners.
V. CONCLUSION
Trademark counterfeiting is a problem that cuts at the very
fabric of society. It threatens lives and jobs and the confidence we
have in the goods we use. Criminal sanctions under the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act of 1984 have made few inroads into the ravages
of trademark counterfeiting. The Act itself provides the necessary
committee, verified links between organized crime and several trademark counterfeiting
industries. SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 13, at 28.
271 See supra note 11.
272 See supra note 231.
273 Rakoff & Wolff, supra note 20, at 164 n.44.
274 Id. at 164.
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tools to combat the problem, and the judicial response to those
tools has been very favorable. Yet the government prosecutes very
few cases under the Act, and alternative remedies, such as interna-
tional efforts through government diplomacy, unilateral leverage,
customs, and state laws, have proven inadequate or remain un-
tested. Furthermore, civil remedies, particularly the ex parte
seizure order, have demonstrated success, but their cost and the in-
congruity of civil remedies combating criminals hamper them. The
government's reliance upon the trademark owner to investigate and
impede counterfeiters has left the crime fighting to the victim,
whose decision not to pursue civil remedies or whose general in-
competence in investigating criminals exposes a gap in consumer
protection. The FBI and United States Attorneys' Offices must
close the gap with greater enforcement of criminal sanctions. Over-
all, government intervention through a consistent program of crimi-
nal investigation and prosecution of counterfeiters would provide
the strongest deterrent to trademark counterfeiting in the market
place and would offer the best assurance of consumer safety and
economic progress. Thus, with incidents of dangerous counterfeit
goods prevalent, and the cost to U.S. industry and the public so
high, the FBI and the United States Attorneys' Offices should take a
greater role in the fight against trademark counterfeiting.
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